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IN THE STTPREMF rOTTRT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN T E E MOD N T A I N ' \ - • • 
ASSOCIATION OF C R E D I T 1 
MEN, a I Jtah Corporation, J 
Plaintiff-Appellant
 f f 
vs. \ Case No. 
' 13377 
T H E V I L L A G E R , INC., 11 
Delaware Corporation and | 
V I L L A G E R I N D U S T R I E S IN C I 
A Corporation, I 
Defendants-Respondents, f 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ST i \ T E M E N T OF K I N D O F CASE 
Plaintiff, as assignee f< r (Jn* benefit of creditors of 
The Company Enterprises, I .K. (hereafter The Com-
pany) sought to have defendants' purported inventory 
security interests declared ni ill and void 
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D I S P O S I T I O N I N L O W E R COURT 
Upon stipulated facts and reciprocal motions for 
summary judgment, the trial court held that on the date 
of the assignment to plaintiff, the defendants held valid 
security interests in The Company's merchandise at 
two of its four retail outlets. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks to reverse that portion of the judg-
ment of the trial court which declared that defendants 
held valid security interests in The Company's mer-
chandise inventory at its retail outlets at 2354 Wash-
ington Boulevard, Ogden, Utah and 22 East First 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
The case was submitted to the trial court on stipu-
lated facts. The essential facts are set forth in the 
written stipulation filed below, dated October 6, 1972 
(R. 57). The written stipulation was supplemented by 
an oral stipulation made at the hearing below on April 
16, 1973, which is incorporated in Paragraph 2 of the 
Court's Findings. (R. 7) 
On the 3rd day of September, 1971, The Company 
made a voluntary assignment for the benefit of creditors 
to the plaintiff, Inter Mountain Association of Credit 
Men (hereafter "Association"). (R. 63) That at the 
time of the assignment, The Company conducted busi-
2 
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ness and maintained a stock of merchandise at four 
retail stores located at 22 East First South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah; 2354 Washington Boulevard, Ogden, Utah; 
1362 Foothill Boulevard, Salt Lake City, Utah; and 
224 South 13th East, Salt Lake City, Utah. In addition, 
The Company maintained a warehouse at 353 Pierpont 
Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Pursuant to the assignment, the Association liqui-
dated the personal property at each of the addresses 
above indicated, including the merchandise inventory 
on hand at the four retail stores. All sales by the Asso-
ciation were in bulk and all were for cash with the ex-
ception of the sale of the personal property located at 
22 East First South, Salt Lake City, Utah. At the 
store last mentioned, the total sales price of all personal 
property, including the merchandise inventory, was 
$58,688.33 (R. 89) of which plaintiff received the sum 
of $30,000.00 in cash and a promissory note for the bal-
ance in the amount of $28,688.33. The full balance is 
still unpaid under the terms of said promissory notes. 
From the other three retail stores, the plaintiff received 
the following amounts, to wit: 
A M O U N T 
ADDRESS B E CsII ,EDOrR O M 
I N V E N T O R Y 
1362 Foothill Boulevard, $36,202.57 (R. 88) 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
224 South 13th East, 23,053.49 (R. 92) 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
2354 Washington Boulevard, 6,954.20 (R. 91) 
Ogden, Utah 
3 
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The defendants (hereafter Villager)1 claim a se-
curity interest in the proceeds of the sale of the inven-
tory pursuant to the assignment for the benefit of 
creditors. Villager claims that at the time of the as-
signment for the benefit of credtiors, it held valid secur-
ity interests on the inventory of The Company located at 
all four retail outlets. Villager's claim stems from two 
security agreements dated November 29, 1968 (R. 65), 
and March 29,1968 (R. 71) whereunder the defendant, 
The Villager, Inc. is the secured party and "the vil-
large brownstone, ltd.", is the debtor. Both security 
agreements contain the following identical provisions 
contained in Paragraph 2 of each instrument, to wit: 
"2. To secure the indebtedness set forth above, 
the Undersigned hereby grants to Villager a se-
curity interest in and to all of the Undersigned's 
present and future accounts, contract rights, gen-
eral intangibles, instruments, documents, chattel 
paper, and a purchase money security interest in 
the inventory wherever located, and the proceeds 
and products thereof (all hereinafter called 'Col-
lateral'), together with all other items of Collat-
eral of the same class or classes acquired by the 
Undersigned after the execution of this agree-
ment and prior to its termination." (Emphasis 
supplied) 
Notice of the security interest claimed was given in 
accordance with Section 70A-9-401 (1) (b) by filing 
a financing statement with the Secretary of State on 
the 14th day of April, 1969 (R. 70) and the 19th day 
iFor purposes of this case, defendants are treated as one— 
Village Industries being the assignee or partial assignee of The 
Villager, Inc. 
4 
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of March, 1968 (R. 76) respectively. All of the in-
ventory on hand at the four retail locations of The 
Company at the time of the assignment was purchased 
by The Company from suppliers other than the Vil-
lager. (R. 60) At the time of the execution of the two 
security agreements, however, Villager was the sole sup-
pliers of the merchandise inventory to the Village 
Brownstone, Ltd. at its two retail outlets at 22 East 
First South, Salt Lake City, Utah and 2354 Wash-
ington Blvd., Ogden, Utah. (R. 60) 
On the 30th day of July, 1970, The Village 
Brownstone, Ltd. merged with The Company Enter-
prises; Village Ltd.; and Village Brownstone Enter-
prises. The Company Enterprises was the survivor of 
the merger and it continued to do business at the two 
addresses theretofore operated by The Village Brown-
stone, Ltd. and in addition thereto maintained retail 
stores at 1362 Foothill Blvd. and 224 South 13th East, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 59) The Company con-
ducted business at the retail store outlets previously 
occupied by The Village Brownstone, Ltd. under the 
assumed name of "Village Brownstone". (R. 58) 
Prior to the merger, Villager supplied merchandise 
to the Village Brownstone Enterprises, doing business 
at the Biltmore Plaza, Phoenix, Arizona (R. 61) On 
November 1, 1968, Villager obtained a security agree-
ment from The Village Brownstone Enterprises which 
unlike that of The Village Brownstone, Ltd., did not 
restrict the interest of Villager to a purchase money 
5 
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security interest in inventory* Paragraph 2 thereof pro-
vided: 
"2. To secure the indebtedness set forth above, 
the Undersigned hereby grants to Villager a se-
curity interest in and to all of the Undersigned s 
present and future accounts, contract rights, gen-
eral intangibles, instruments, documents, chattel 
paper, equipment (including, but not limited to, 
machinery, furniture, furnishings and fixtures), 
•ami t^iijuiiilwywhftpciu iututufl; and Ibt piuuuudj 
and inventory wherever located. . . . " 
Villager filed a financing statement on April 21, 1969 
with the Secretary of State's office of the State of Ari-
zona. No financing statement was filed with the Utah 
Secretary of State relating to the security agreement 
with The Village Brownstone Enterprises. (R. 61) 
Following the merger Villager continued to 
supply merchandise to the prior retail outlets of 
The Village Brownstone, Ltd., in Utah and The Vil-
lage Brownstone Enterprises in Arizona, although 
none of this merchandise was on hand at the time of 
the assignment for the benefit of the creditors. The 
total amount unpaid due defendants as of the date of 
the assignment on September 3, 1971, was the sum 
of $55,249.07 of which $38,381.87 represented the 
balance for merchandise shipped and sold to the outlets 
in Utah and $16,867.20 represented the balance for 
merchandise shipped and sold to the outlets in Arizona. 
(R. 61) 
None of the merchandise inventory in the State 
of Arizona was included or made a part of the assign-
6 
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ment for the benefit of creditors on September 3, 1971. 
(R. 62) 
On September 3, 1971, at the time of the assign-
ment for the benefit of creditors, no part of the inven-
tory or merchandise owned by The Village Brown-
stone, Ltd. at the time of the security agreements re-
ferred to or owned by The Village Brownstone, Ltd. 
at the time of the merger on July 30, 1970 was in exist-
ence. (R. 60) 
A R G U M E N T 
Fixtures, as well as inventory, were liquidated by 
the Association. Villager concedes, however, and the 
trial court so determined, that its claim is limited solely 
to the proceeds of the inventory inasmuch as fixtures 
and equipment were not covered by any of its security 
agreements relied upon. The question then is whether 
Villager is entitled to the proceeds from the sale of the 
inventory or any part thereof. Upon analysis, this is in 
reality a three-fold question: 
(1). Can Villager claim a security interest in in-
ventory acquired after the date of the security agree-
ments ? 
(2). If so, will Villager's security interests extend 
to such after-acquired inventory on hand at the date 
of the assignment for the benefit of creditors, when 
all of such inventory was acquired after the merger 
by The Company as survivor of the merger and not by 
7 
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The Village Brownstone, Ltd., the debtor under the 
security agreement (R. 60); and 
(3). where none of such after-acquired inventory 
was purchased from Villager, although Villager is 
restricted by its own agreements to a "purchase money 
security interest?" 
The Association concedes that security inter-
ests in property to be acquired in the future were 
specifically recognized in Utah even before the en-
actment of the Uniform Commercial Code. Mcin-
tosh v. United States, 21 U. 2d, 12, 439 P.2d 464 
(1968). The applicable code provision is found at 
70A-9-204 (3) U.C.A. 1953, as amended. Accordingly, 
as a general proposition, Villager is entitled to assert 
a security interest in after-acquired property; but it is 
the Association's position that the after-acquired prop-
erty clause of Villager's several security agreements 
does not extend to the inventory liquidated by the As-
sociation under the assignment for the benefit of credi-
tors. Accordingly, it is plaintiff's position that the 
answers to questions (2) and (3) above should be in 
the negative. Those questions will be discused in reverse 
order. 
P O I N T I. 
V I L L A G E R W A S L I M I T E D TO A P U R -
C H A S E M O N E Y S E C U R I T Y I N T E R E S T 
ONLY, A N D ACCORDINGLY, T H E COURT 
E R R E D I N D E C L A R I N G A V A L I D SECUR-
I T Y I N T E R E S T I N I N V E N T O R Y O F T H E 
8 
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COMPANY P U R C H A S E D FROM CREDITORS 
O T H E R T H A N V I L L A G E R . 
The agreed facts show that on July 30, 1970, The 
Company Enterprises emerged as survivor of merger 
of four constituent corporations: The Village Brown-
stone, Ltd.; Village Ltd.; Village Brownstone Enter-
prises; and The Company Enterprises. (R. 59) Vil-
lage Brownstone, Ltd. gave security agreements to 
the Villager, on March 29, 1968 and November 29, 
1968, together with financing statements filed with the 
Utah Secretary of State on March 19, 1968 and April 
14, 1969 respectively. (R. 58) The Village Brown-
stone Ltd. was doing business in two locations. The 
earlier security agreement relates to the retail outlet 
at 22 East First South, Salt Lake City, Utah and the 
later security agreement relates to the retail outlet at 
2354 Washington Boulevard, Ogden, Utah. In both 
security agreements the following identical language 
is contained in Paragraph 2 thereof (R. 65, 71) 
"2. To secure the indebtedness set forth above, 
the Undersigned hereby grants to Villager a se-
curity interest in and to all of the Undersigned's 
peresent and future accounts, contract rights, 
general intangibles, instruments, documents, 
chattel paper, and a purchase money security in-
terest in the inventory wherever located, and the 
proceeds and products thereof (all hereinafter 
called the 'Collateral'), together with all other 
items of Collateral of the same class or classes 
acquired by the Undersigned after the execution 
of this agreement and prior to its termination." 
(Emphasis supplied) 
9 
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Although the financing statement filed on April 14, 
1969 (R. 70) describes the collateral as * 'inventory 
wherever located", the earlier financing statement filed 
March 19, 1968 contains the following language, to 
wit: "the secured party claims a purchase money se-
curity interest in the inventory". (R. 76) 
The security agreements in question provide that 
they are to be construed under the laws of the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania. Paragraph 7 (h) of each agree-
ment provides as follows: 
"(h) This security agreement and the transaction 
evidenced hereby shall be construed under the 
laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as 
the same may from time to time be in effect, in-
cluding, without limitation, the Uniform Com-
mercial Code." (Emphasis Supplied) 
A "purchase money security interest" is a term of 
art under the Uniform Commercial Code. The pro-
visions of both the Pennsylvania and the Utah Uni-
form Commercial Code are identical as they relate to 
that term, since both states have followed the 1962 
Official Text of the American Law Institute, National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 
A purchase money security interest is defined by the 
Code at Section 70A-9-107, U.C.A., 1953, as amended, 
as follows: 
" 'Purchase money security interest.'—A security 
interest is a 'purchase money security interest' to 
the extent that it is (a) taken or retained by the 
seller of the collateral to secure all or part of its 
price; or 
10 
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(b) taken by a person who by making advances 
or incurring an obligation gives value to enable 
the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collat-
eral if such value is in fact so used." (Emphasis 
supplied) 
A "purchase money security interest" differs from a 
security interest generally because of the preferred 
status afforded a purchase money security interest under 
the Uniform Commercial Code. For example, Section 
70A-9-312 (3) U.C.A. 1953, as amended, affords 
priority to a purchase money security interest in inven-
tory collateral, if perfected prior to delivery, although 
there may be outstanding at the time of the purchase 
a prior security agreement from the purchaser to a 
third party granting the latter a security interest in 
after-acquired property. Section 70A-9-312 (4) U.C.A. 
1953, as amended, affords the same priority to a pur-
chase money security interest in collateral other than 
inventory, if perfected at the time of delivery or within 
10 days thereafter. Section 70A-9-301 (2) U.C.A. 
1953, as amended, affords priority to the holder of a 
purchase money security interest over attaching credi-
tors, assignees for the benefit of creditors, receivers 
and trustees in Bankruptcy, although these latter per-
sons acquire their respective rights before the holder 
of the security interest files a financing statement, pro-
vided filing takes place within ten days from the date 
the debtor takes possession of the collateral. Although 
not applicable here, the Code in Section 70A-9-302 
also affords priority over all but bona fide third party 
purchasers for value to the holder of a purchase money 
11 
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security interest in certain farm equipment and con-
sumer goods, without the necessity of filing a financing 
statetment at all. 
At the time these security agreements were ex-
ecuted, Villager was the franchisor and sole supplier 
of inventory to its franchisee, The Village Brownstone, 
Ltd. (R. 60, 65). The Villager, being the seller of the 
inventory, could protect its interest therein against any 
possible prior conflicting security interest if it held a 
purchase money security interest, but not otherwise. 
Section 70A-9-312 (4) U.C.A. 1953, as amended. If 
Villager had not specifically characterized its interest 
as "purchase money", it might lose that preferred 
status because Paragraph 1 of its security agreements 
relating to the indebtedness secured is extremely 
broad and includes any and all indebtedness, not 
limited to merely the purchase price of the goods sold. 
There is respectable authority holding that provisions 
in a security agreement which purport to secure ad-
vances in addition to the purchase price of the col-
lateral, may disqualify the security interest from being 
a "purchase money security interest." See, In Re 
Simpson, 4 UCC. Rep. Serv. 243 (W.D. Mich. 1966); 
In Re Simpson, 4 UCC. Rep. Serv. 250 (W.D. Mich. 
1966). Therefore, by specifically characterizing its 
security interest as "purchase money" the Villager per-
haps protected its interest against third parties, but in 
so doing, it, of necessity limited the scope of its appli-
cation. 
12 
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Where a secured party secures only the purchase 
price of the collateral, he may hold a purchase money 
security interest in collateral without expressly so pro-
viding. Conversely, however, the parties here chose to 
expressly provide that the only security interest in 
inventory granted to the Villager was a "purchase 
money" security interest, i.e., a security interest taken 
by the Villager as "seller of the collateral to secure 
all or part of its price." The reference in the agree-
ment to "all other items of collateral of the same class 
or classes acquired . . . after the execution of this 
agreement . . . ," admittedly includes inventory. How-
ever, the only interest granted in inventory was a "pur-
chase money security interest" which must be taken to 
modify both the word "inventory" and the words "all 
others items of collateral of the same class". Villager 
has never contended that the use of that term was in-
advertent. Indeed, Paragraph 2 (quoted above) of 
the security agreements in question grant a general 
security interest in all collateral therein described other 
than inventory, but carefully restricts the security in-
terest in inventory to a "purchase money" interest. Con-
trast also, the security agreement with the Village, 
Brownstone Enterprises in Arizona (R. 61, 82). 
Construing the security agreements more strictly 
against Villager, being the party that drew the instru-
ment, it is submitted that it granted a security interest 
in after-acquired inventory only if it was the seller 
thereof. Skousen v. Smith, 493 P.2d 1003, 27 Utah 2d, 
1969 (1972), and cases and authorities cited therein. 
13 
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See also, General Mills v. Cragun, 134 P.2d 1089, 
1093-4 (Utah, 1943). 
The agreement of the parties is clear and unam-
biguous. The Villager bargained for and was clearly 
granted a security interest in inventory which it was 
to sell to its debtor—nothing more. The trial court 
erred in expanding the agreement beyond the clear 
import of its language and the clear intent of the 
parties thereto. 
I I 
T H E A F T E R - A C Q U I R E D P R O P E R T Y 
C L A U S E OF V I L L A G E R S S E C U R I T Y 
A G R E E M E N T S W I T H T H E C O N S T I T U E N T 
CORPORATION ( V I L L A G E B R O W N S T O N E , 
LTD.) DOES NOT E X T E N D TO P R O P E R T Y 
A C Q U I R E D S U B S E Q U E N T TO M E R G E R BY 
T H E SURVIVING CORPORATION ( T H E 
COMPANY). 
The two security agreements in question attached 
to the Stipulation of Facts (R. 65, 71) purport to en-
cubmer "all other items of collateral of the same class 
or classes acquired by the (debtor) after the execution 
of (the) agreement and prior to its termination". The 
property upon which the defendants seek to impose their 
security interest was not property that was acquired 
by "Village Brownstone, Ltd.", the debtor under said 
security agreements. The property was property that 
was acquired by the survivor of merger, The Company 
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Enterprises. The Association concedes that a merger 
or consolidation cannot ordinarily impair the rights 
of a lien holder in property existing at the time of the 
merger. See, Sec. 16-10-71 (e) U.C.A. 1953, as 
amended, and 70A-9-306 (2) U.C.A. 1953, as amended. 
However, none of the property liquidated by the As-
sociation was in existence at the time of the merger. 
The so-called after-acquired clause of the security 
agreements, purporting to create an interest in goods 
acquired in the future, should have no relation to goods 
acquired by a corporation other than the debtor under 
the agreement. Otherwise, subsequent innocent but 
diligent third party creditors are totally deprived of any 
means of notice of prior liens. A potential lender, sup-
plier or other creditor would have no way to determine 
the existence of prior outstanding security interests 
since the financing statement on file with the Secretary 
of State would be in the name of the constituent cor-
poration, not the survivor. Moreover, it is manifestly 
inequitable and unfair to other creditors of the debtor 
who in reliance upon the appearance of clear, unen-
cumbered assets, extend credit. Indeed, in the instant 
case, such creditors may even have been suppliers to 
The Company on open account of the very goods in 
which the Villager has now been granted a security 
interest. What, in effect, the trial court has counten-
anced is a "secret lien". Cf. In Re Vieihs, 9 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. 943 (E.D. Wis. 1971) where the court 
stated: 
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"The purpose of the filing requirements are quite 
obvious. The purpose is to give notice to the pub-
lic, and to future creditors, that the assets of a 
debtor are encumbered. The evil to be protected 
against is a 'secret lien' against the assets of a 
debtor which might cause innocent parties to ex-
tend credit to such debtor without knowledge of 
the prior lien. To allow one creditor to have a 
secret lien would be a fraud on all other creditors. 
That is exactly what the bank had in this case— 
a secret lien. The notice flied under the name, 
Edwin J . Kuhn, was not notice that any lien 
existed against the assets of the corporation, 
Vieths, Inc. Creditors are not required to look 
under the name of the president of a corporation 
to determine whether liens exist. The notice must 
be filed under the name of the corporation. For 
this reason the bank had a secret lien not properly 
filed." 
The early recognition and application in the United 
States of liens on after-acquired property occurred in-
variably in those cases where a public utility was the 
mortgagor. In the early case of Galveston, Houston, 
etc. R.R. Co. v, Cowdrey, 78 U.S. 459, 20 L.Ed. 199 
(1871), the Supreme Court expressed the reason for 
recognition of after-acquired clauses in utility mort-
gages as follows: 
"Had there been but one deed of trust, and had 
that been given before a shovel had been put into 
the ground towards constructing the railroad, yet 
if it assumed to convey and mortgage the railroad, 
which the Company was authorized by law to 
build, together with its superstructures, appurt-
enances, fixtures and rolling stock, these several 
items of property, as they came into existence, 
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would become instantly attached to and covered 
by the deed, and would have fed the estoppel 
created thereby. No other rational or equitable 
rule can be adopted for such cases. To hold other-
wise would render it necessary for a railroad 
company to borrow money in small parcels as 
sections of the road were completed, and trust 
deeds could safely be given thereon. The prac-
tice of the country and its necessities are in co-
incidence with the rule" (Emphasis supplied) 
See also, Thompson v. White Water Valley Railroad 
Company, 132 U.S. 68, 33 L.Ed. 256, 260 (1889). 
Indeed, many state legislatures expressly made effec-
tive after-acquired clauses in mortgages by this class 
of corporation. See, Foley and Pogue, After-Acquired 
Property Under Conflicting Corporate Mortgage In-
dentures, 13 Minn. L. Rev. 81, 88, n. 15 (1929). 
However, even in cases involving public utilities, 
the courts were reluctant to extend the concept to prop-
erty acquired by a successor corporation. Indeed, it 
appears to be well established law that in those juris-
dictions where corporate mortgages on after-acquired 
property were recognized, the concept was limited to 
property acquired by the mortgagor only and did not 
include property acquired by a successor corporation. 
Vol. 7, Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations, 1964 Rev. 
Vol., Sec. 3110 p. 241 et seq.; Metropolitan Trust Co. 
of City of N.Y. v. Chicago & E.I.R. Co., 253 Fed. 868 
(7th Cir., 1918); 13 Minn. L. Rev. 81, 85, supra. In 
the case of Susquehanna Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. 
United Tel. & Tel. Co., 6 F.2d 179 (3rd Cir. 1925), the 
17 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
court, in considering this question, there stated the law 
as follows: 
"While this indubitably is the law of mortgages 
and deeds of trust covering after-acquired prop-
erty, yet it does not go to the extent of holding 
that, under the usual after-acquired property pro-
vision, the lien of such a mortgage or deed of 
trust, on consolidation of a mortgagor corpora-
tion with another, spreads to the property con-
tributed by the other constituent, nor does it ex-
tend to other property of a new debtor who, as 
here, has merely assumed the debt of the mort-
gage containing the after-acquired property 
clause. A mortgage containing such a clause ex-
tends only to the property, presently and pro-
spectively held, which it professes to cover, and 
only to property then owned and subsequently 
acquired by the mortgagor or by another in vir-
tue of the mortgagor's rights." 
Admittedly, certain exceptions to the general rule 
were declared by some courts. Those exceptions gen-
erally related to particular statutory provisions con-
cerning consolidations, mergers, or dissolutions; to 
express covenants assuming the mortgage obligation 
(not merely the debt alone); to those cases where the 
after-acquired property is an accession to the pre-
merger,, pre-consolidation property of the constituent 
corporation; or to special cases where the successor 
corporation has committed a tort such as interfering 
with the affirmative obligation under the mortgage of 
the constituent (mortgagor) to acquire additional prop-
erty. 13 Minn. L. Rev. 88, 91, et. seq., supra. 
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An analysis of each of these exceptions and the 
cases involving their application, however, disclose that 
in almost every instance the mortgagor involved is a 
public utility and that its successors by way of con-
solidation, merger or purchase acquired the property 
in order to salvage the existing utility and to preserve 
or expand its facilities for the public's use. In the case 
of Susquehanna Trust k Safe Deposit Co. v. United 
Tel. k Tel Co., supra, the historical plight of many of 
these public utility companies is typified in the state-
ment by the court relative to the controversy it was 
called upon to decide: 
"This case had its rise in the early days of the 
telephone, when numberless local corporations, 
not realizing the operative and commercial scope 
of the invention, built short lines and established 
small systems in limited areas. They did this 
largely on borrowed money. The outcome of these 
adventures, as their history shows, was feeble suc-
cess or complete failure, resulting ultimately in 
receiverships or absorption by larger concerns. 
After purchase or merger, properties thus ac-
quired, being already pledged for money bor-
rowed, were usually pledged again by the absorb-
ing corporations, and still again by larger absorb-
ing corporations, until on the original properties 
rested many liens of different sizes and priorities. 
The instruments creating such liens—whether 
mortgages or deeds of trust—frequently con-
tained clauses covering after-acquired property 
and on foreclosure there often arose the question 
as to which of many instruments was paramount 
in respect to property thus acquired and, accord-
ingly, which of many liens thereon was first." 
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Accordingly, these early rules and exceptions thereto 
were developed by the courts to fit the rather unique 
plight of the public utility corporation, clothed as it 
was with a public interest. In this connection it should 
be noted that in those instances where after-acquired 
property had no relation to the public use, albeit the 
mortgagor was a public utility, such property was held 
not to be covered by the after-acquired clause of a 
mortgage, even when such property was acquired by 
the original mortgagor. See, Note: 33 L.Ed. 256; 13 
Minn. L. Rev., 81, 86, n. 22, supra. 
I t is submitted that the exceptions noted above 
should be restricted to the area of their origins—that 
of the public utility corporation and not extended to 
cases involving corporations not clothed with a public 
interest. 
Assuming, for purposes of argument only, that 
these exceptions are applicable to mercantile corpora-
tions not clothed with a public interest, there is nothing 
in the record before the court to justify the application 
of any of the exceptions noted. There was no express 
covenant of assumption of the mortgage by The Com-
pany Enterprises as survivor of merger; the principle 
of accession is inapplicable; and no tortious conduct 
on the part of the survivor was alleged or shown. The 
only relevant statutory provision is contained in Section 
16-10-71 (e) U.C.A. 1953, as amended, which provides 
as follows: 
"(e) Such surviving or new corporation shall 
thenceforth be responsible and liable for all the 
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liabilities and obligations of each of the corpora-
tions so merged or consolidated; and any claim 
existing or action or proceeding pending by or 
against any of such corporations may be prose-
cuted as if such merger or consolidation had not 
taken place, or such surviving or new corporation 
may be substituted in its place. Neither the 
right (s) of creditors nor any liens upon the prop-
erty of any such corporation shall be impaired by 
such merger or consolidation." (Emphasis sup-
plied). 
As suggested earlier in this brief, the statutory 
language noted above must of necessity relate to prop-
erty of the constituent corporation in eocistence at the 
time of merger. This, because no lien can exist until 
there is property in existence to which it can attach. 
I t is only at such time as the property is acquired by 
the debtor that the security interest will attach. Section 
70A-9-204, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, provides in 
pertinent part as follows: 
" (1) A security interest cannot attach until there 
is an agreement . . . that it attach and value is 
given and the debtor has rights in the collateral. 
I t attaches as soon as all of the events in the pre-
ceding sentence have taken place unless explicit 
agreement postpones the time of attaching." 
See also, Mcintosh v. U.S., supra. 
Accordingly, the language of Section 16-10-71, 
supra, on its face, does not extend defendant's after-
acquired lien clause to property acquired subsequent 
to the merger by the survivor of merger. Indeed, the 
statute expressly restricts its provisions to existing 
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liens on existing property of a constituent corporation. 
Had the legislature intended to preserve inviolate 
after-acquired lien rights upon post-merger property 
acquired by the survivor, it would have been a rela-
tively simple matter to do so provide. 
The case of Metropolitan Trust Co. v. Chicago 
& E.I.R. Co., supra, is instructive in the interpretation 
of the statutory provision just quoted. The court in 
that case was called upon to construe provisions of an 
actual consolidation agreement whereunder, among 
other things, the consolidated company agreed that two 
earlier mortgages executed by the several constituent 
companies, each containing after-acquired property 
clauses, "shall have the force and effect of first mort-
gages executed by this consolidated company." The 
Court, at p. 876, in speaking of this provision of the 
agreement of consolidation, stated: 
"The inclusion of the Metropolitan (mortgage) 
in Article V I I had no essential significance be-
yond the definite recognition by the Consolidated 
Company of the mortgage as a lien upon part of 
the property so about to pass to the Consolidated 
Company and of the purpose to close the mort-
gage to the further issue of bonds thereunder. 
Under the law as it is stated in the above quota-
tion from brief for appellant, the situation of the 
Metropolitan mortgage is not materially differ-
ent from what it would have been had all refer-
ence to it been omitted from article VI I . In such 
case it would plainly not have been contended 
that any lien thereunder was extended to any fu-
ture acquisitions or ecctensions of the Consoli-
dated Company." (Emphasis supplied) 
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Another provision in the consolidated agreement pro-
vided for the assumption of the debts and obligations 
of the constituent companies by the consolidated com-
pany. The court, holding that this provision like the 
provision above referred to in Article V I I of the agree-
ment, did not, in and of itself, extend the after-acquired 
property clause to property acquired after the consoli-
dation, stated: 
"Another instance in the same consolidation 
agreement of the distinct expression of that 
which in any event the law would impose is found 
in article X, whereby the Consolidated Company 
assumes all the debts and obligations of the con-
stituent companies. The definite expression of 
this obligation does not suggest that one should 
seek in it a significance or meaning beyond oi\ 
different from the general obligation of a con-
solidated corporation to discharge the debts of tis 
constituents." (Emphasis supplied) 
By the same reasoning the statutory language 
quoted above imposes no greater obligations upon the 
surviving corporation than would otherwise be imposed 
in the absence of such provisions. Accordingly, there is 
no legal basis available to the Villager to claim an 
exception to the general rule, even assuming such ex-
ception is applicable to a mercantile corporation. 
POINT III 
THE SECURITY AGREEMENTS OF THE 
DEFENDANTS ARE INVALID AS AGAINST 
THE PLAINTIFF ASSIGNEE FOR THE 
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B E N E F I T O F CREDITORS, B E C A U S E T H E 
F I N A N C I N G S T A T E M E N T S ON F I L E A R E 
D E F I C I E N T W I T H I N T H E M E A N I N G OF 
SECTION 70A-9-402 U.C.A. 1953,AS A M E N D E D . 
Section 70A-9-301 U.C.A. 1953, as amended, pro-
vides in pertinent part as follows: 
" (1) Except as otherwise provided in subsection 
(2), an unperfected security interest is subordi-
nate to the rights of . . . (b) a person who becomes 
a lien creditor without knowledge of the security 
interest and before it is perfected; . • . 
(3) A 'lien creditor' means a creditor who has ac-
quired a lien on the property involved by attach-
ment, levy or the like and includes an assignee for 
benefit of creditors from the time of assignment, 
and a trustee in bankruptcy from the date of the 
filing of the petition or a receiver in equity from 
the time of appointment. Unless all the creditors 
represented had knowledge of the security inter-
est such a representative of creditors is a lien 
creditor without knowledge even though he per-
sonally has knowledge of the security interest." 
(Emphasis Supplied) 
Section 70A-9-302, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, re-
quires that a financing statement must be filed in order 
to perfect all security interests, with certain exceptions 
not applicable in the instant case. The financing state-
ment on file at the time of the assignment for the benefit 
of the creditors was deficient because it did not contain 
the name of the debtor-assignor, to wit: The Company 
Enterprises. The financing statement on file showed 
the debtor to be The Village Brownstone, Ltd. (R-70, 
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76) Sub-paragraph 3 of Section 70A-9-402 provides 
that the financing statement to be filed must contain 
the name of the debtor in order to be sufficient within 
the meaning of the statute. The debtor here was the sur-
vivor of the merger, The Company—not the Village 
Brownstone, Ltd., which ceased to exist as of the date 
of the merger. 
What has heretofore been said regarding secret 
liens under Point I I of this Brief applies to this Point 
with equal force. In the case of In Re Viebhs, Inc., 
vu/pra, quoted above, the court invalidated a bank's pur-
ported security interest in its debtor's inventory because 
the Bank, with full knowledge of the transfer of the 
inventory from a sole proprietorship to a corporation, 
failed to file a new financing statement in the name of 
the new corporation, relying on the original financing 
statement filed in the name of the individual only. The 
court there acknowledged that had the transfer occurred 
without the knowledge or consent of the Bank, its lien 
in the original collateral would have continued by reason 
of the provisions of Section 9-306 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code. The court, having determined the 
invalidity of the bank's security interest as against the 
Trustee in Bankruptcy, was not required to meet the 
additional contention of the Bank that its lien was 
valid as to both the original inventory and property 
acquired after the date of incorporation. On this point, 
the court said: 
"Thus if the debtor in this case had formed a cor-
poration and then transferred his assets to the 
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corporation without the knowledge or consent of 
the bank, the bank's lien on the original collateral 
would have continued. Whether it would be good 
against after-acquired inventory purchased by 
the corporation would be open to serious ques-
tion. However, in the case before the court, that 
question need not be reached." (Emphasis sup-
plied) 
The doubt expressed by the court is justified by the 
wording of Section 9-306 (2) of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (70A-9-306 (2) U.C.A. 1953, as amend-
ed), which provides as follows: 
"(2) Except where this chapter otherwise pro-
vides, a security interest continues in collateral 
notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposi-
tion thereof by the debtor unless his action was 
authorized by the secured party in the security 
agreement or otherwise, and also continues in any 
identifiable proceeds including collections re-
ceived by the debtor." 
As with the provisions of Section 16-10-71 (e) U.C.A. 
1953, as amended, supra, the quoted provision of the 
Utah Uniform Commercial Code must of necessity refer 
to an existing security interest since there can be no 
security interest, let alone one that "continues in col-
lateral," until collateral to which the interest can at-
tach is in existence. Section 70A-9-204 U.C.A. 1953, 
as amended, supra. Admittedly, there is no evidence, 
one way or the other, relative to the Villager's actual 
knowledge of or consent to the merger. For the reasons 
stated, however, it is submitted that its knowledge or 
consent is immaterial. 
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The fact that The Company continued to do business 
at the two locations previously occupied by The Village 
Brownstone (R-58) is immaterial. The overwhelming 
majority of cases called upon to consider this question 
have ruled that filing a financing statement in the trade 
name as distinguished from the debtor's actual name 
is ineffective, is "seriously misleading" and is a fatal 
defect. In the recent case of Northern Commercial 
Corp. v. Friedman, 471 F.2d 785 (2nd Cir. 1972), the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held a financ-
ing statement to be defective that was filed under the 
debtor's duly registered assumed business name of 
"Landman Dry Cleaners", rather than the debtor's true 
name, Matthew L. Leichter. As the court there stated: 
"If the debtor's name is not given, the purpose of 
the statutory scheme of requiring security inter-
ests to be perfected by filing a financing state-
ment—to give notice to future creditors of the 
debtor—would be seriously undermined." 
See also, Van Dusen Acceptance Corp. v. Gough, 466 
F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1972); In Be Jones, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. 249 (E.D. Wis. 1972); In Re Eichler, 9 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. 1400 (E.D. Wis. 1971); In Re Merrill, 9 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 757 (D. Neb., 1971); In Re Levens, 
7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1076 (E.D. N.Y. 1970); Coca 
Cola Bottling Plants, Inc. v. Tabenken, 7 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. 565, (D. Maine, 1970); In Re Thomas, 310 F . 
Supp. 338, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 800 (N.D. Calif., 
1970); In Re Uptown Variety, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
221 (D. Ore. 1969); In Re The Grape Arbor, Inc., 6 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 632 (E.D. Pa., 1969); John Deere 
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Co. of Baltimore, Inc. v. Pahl Const. Co., 300 N.Y.S. 
2d 701, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 840 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 
1969). 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in determining that The Vil-
lager held valid security interests in the inventory of 
The Company on hand at 2354 Washington Blvd., 
Ogden, Utah and 22 East First South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah at the time of the assignment for the benefit of 
creditors, and the case should be reversed and remanded 
for the entry of judgment declaring The Villager's 
purported lien null and void as to all inventory. This 
result is required because The Villager was specifically 
and expressly limited by the terms of its security agree-
ments to a purchase money security interest only, 
whereas the inventory at the time of the assignment for 
the benefit of creditors was inventory not purchased 
from The Villager; because the after-acquired property 
clause in the constituent corporation's (Village Brown-
stone, Ltd.) security agreement with The Villager does 
not extend to property acquired by the survivor of the 
merger, The Company Enterprises; and because, in 
any event, there was no proper financing statement on 
file with the Secretary of State at the time of the as-
signment for the benefit of creditors. 
Respectfully submitted, 
M O Y L E & D R A P E R 
Herschel J . Saperstein 
Attorneys for Plaintiffi — C^^eAleuf 
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